Narrated Monologue

**INITIAL DESCRIPTION.** In a German Naturalist story entitled *Papa Hamlet* (1889), which recounts the mental and physical decay of a Shakespearean actor, one finds the following passage:

He had of late—but wherefore he knew not—lost all his mirth, forgone all custom of exercises; and indeed it went so heavily with his disposition that this goodly frame, the earth, seemed to him a sterile promontory; this most excellent canopy, the air, this brave o’erhanging firmament, this majestical roof fretted with golden fire, why it appeared no other thing to him than a foul and pestilent congregation of vapors. What a piece of work was a man! how noble in reason! how infinite in faculty! in form and moving how express and admirable! in action how like an angel! in apprehension how like a god! the beauty of the world! the paragon of animals! And yet, to him, what was this quintessence of dust? man delighted him not; no, nor woman neither.!

With the assistance of Shakespeare (Hamlet, II, 2) the translation is my own; it is no less exact than the “German Shakespeare” (the celebrated Schlegel-Tieck translation) which dictated every detail of this passage in the original. Every detail, that is, except its person and tense. For, as is immediately apparent, this is *Hamlet* with a difference: third-person pronouns have replaced first-person pronouns, the past tense has replaced the present. The result is not “Shakespeare” (a *quotation* of Hamlet’s monologue), but “narrated Shakespeare” (a *narration* of Hamlet’s monologue). What is the meaning of this transformation?

The Shakespearean language in this passage cannot be attributed to the narrator of *Papa Hamlet*, who speaks—in the purely narrative portions of the text—the neutrally reportorial language typical for the narrator of a Naturalist story. His protagonist, by contrast, habitually declaims Shakespeare to himself and others, and by this professional deformation feeds his need to dramatize...
and euphemize his sordid experiences. Even a reader of this story who has never heard of the technique of the "narrated monologue" will recognize that the above passage renders what Papa Hamlet thinks to himself rather than what his narrator reports about him. He will instinctively "redress" this text to mean that Papa Hamlet "thought to himself: 'I have of late—but wherefore I know not—lost all my mirth.'"

A transformation of figural thought-language into the narrative language of third-person fiction is precisely what characterizes the technique for rendering consciousness that will occupy us throughout this chapter, and that I call the narrated monologue. It may be most succinctly defined as the technique for rendering a character's thought in his own idiom while maintaining the third-person reference and the basic tense of narration. This definition implies that a simple transposition of grammatical person and tense will "translate" a narrated into an interior monologue. Such translations can actually be applied as a kind of litmus test to confirm the validity of a reader's apprehension that a narrative sentence belongs to a character's, rather than to a narrator's, mental domain.³

But before I discuss this and other critical problems attending the narrated monologue, I will add to the rather farfetched initial illustration others taken from the mainstream of the modern narrative tradition. They will show that, even when fictional characters have less idiosyncratic thinking styles than Papa Hamlet's, their narrated monologues are easy to identify. I provide a minimal context in each case, and italicize the sentences in narrated monologue form.

1. Woolf's Septimus in Regent's Park, after Rezia has removed her wedding ring:

"My hand has grown so thin," she said. "I have put it in my purse," she told him.

He dropped her hand. Their marriage was over, he thought, with agony, with relief.

The rope was cut; he mounted, he was free, as it was decreed that he, Septimus, the lord of men, should be free; alone (since his wife had thrown away her wedding ring; since she had left him), he, Septimus, was alone, called forth in advance of the mass of men to hear the truth, to learn the meaning, which now at last, after all the toils of civilisation—Greeks, Romans, Shakespeare, Darwin, and now himself—was to be given whole to . . . "To whom?" he asked aloud. [Woolf's ellipsis]⁴

2. Kafka's K. walking through the night with Barnabas (the messenger from the castle):

At that moment Barnabas stopped. Where were they? Was this the end of the road? Would Barnabas leave K.? He wouldn't succeed. K. clutched Barnabas' arm so firmly that he almost hurt himself. Or had the incredible happened, and were they already in the Castle or at its gates? But they had not done any climbing so far as K. could tell. Or had Barnabas taken him up by an imperceptibly mounting road?

"Where are we?" asked K. in a low voice, more of himself than of Barnabas.⁵
3. Joyce's Stephen Dedalus waiting for confession:

The slide was shot to suddenly. The penitent came out. He was next. He stood up in terror and walked blindly into the box.

*At last it had come*. He knelt in the silent gloom and raised his eyes to the white crucifix suspended above him. *God could see that he was sorry. He would tell all his sins. His confession would be long, long. Everybody in the chapel would know then what a sinner he had been. Let them know. It was true. But God had promised to forgive him if he was sorry. He was sorry.* He clasped his hands and raised them towards the white form, praying with his darkened eyes, praying with all his trembling body, swaying his head to and fro like a lost creature, praying with whimpering lips.6

What the italicized portions of these passages most obviously share is that they cannot be read as standard narration. Narrative language appears in them as a kind of mask, from behind which sounds the voice of a figural mind. Each of its sentences bears the stamp of characteristic limitations and distortions: of Septimus' manic obsessions, K.'s ignorance of present and future circumstance, Stephen's self-serving religiosity. Far more than in ordinary narrative passages, their language teems with questions, exclamations, repetitions, overstatements, colloquialisms. In short, neither the content nor the style of these sentences can be plausibly attributed to their narrators. But both their content and their style become entirely plausible if we understand them as transposed thought-quotations—which is why the “translation” test (as the willing reader can verify) will “work” in each case.

But the point is, of course, that the language a “translation” yields is not in the text. Nor are there other indications that someone is thinking. We are told not “Stephen said to himself: ‘God can see that I am sorry. I will tell all my sins,’” but simply “God could see that he was sorry. He would tell all his sins.” Stephen's personal rapport with the Divinity is treated as if he were formulating it in his mind, but the words on the page are not identified as words running through his mind.7 By leaving the relationship between words and thoughts latent, the narrated monologue casts a peculiarly penumbral light on the figural consciousness, suspending it on the threshold of verbalization in a manner that cannot be achieved by direct quotation. This ambiguity is unquestionably one reason why so many writers prefer the less direct technique.

Another is the seamless junction between narrated monologues and their narrative context. Note how, in the Joyce passage, the text weaves in and out of Stephen's mind without perceptible transitions, fusing outer with inner reality, gestures with thoughts, facts with reflections, as report of posture and gaze—“he knelt . . . and raised his eyes”—gives way to the purely imaginary “God could see . . . God had promised,” which in turn gives way to factual report—“He clasped his hands and raised them.” By employing the same basic tense for the narrator's reporting language and the character's reflecting language, two normally distinct linguistic currents are made to merge.

The Kafka text alternates more rapidly, but no more perceptibly, between report and reflection: “At that moment Barnabas stopped. Where were they? . . . K. clutched Barnabas’ arm so firmly that he almost hurt himself. Or
had the incredible happened...?

By contrast when the very same question that begins the narrated monologue—"Where were they?"—is repeated at its end—"Where are we?"—it cuts off the unified current by direct quotation. Such sudden shifts to directly quoted discourse (silent or spoken) underline the potential-actual relationship between narrated monologue and verbal formulation, creating the impression that a mind’s vague ruminations have irresistibly led to conceptual expression. We get the same pattern at the end of Septimus’ narrated monologue, when an unfinished thought-sentence breaks into a quoted question: "was to be given whole to... ‘To whom?’ he asked aloud.”

The beginning of the Woolf passage illustrates a different junction between narration and narrated monologue. In another standard pattern, a sentence of psycho-narration—“Their marriage was over, he thought, with agony, with relief”—shapes the transition from the preceding report to the narrated monologue, even as it sets the tone (of agony and relief) that reigns in Septimus’s thoughts. As we already noted in the villanelle passage from Joyce’s Portrait (in Chapter 1), psycho-narration flows readily into a narrated monologue, and the latter clinches the narrator-figure cohesion that the former approximates.

We can now profile the narrated monologue more sharply by examining its linguistic relationship with its closest relatives: first with the two rival techniques for rendering consciousness, second with the narration of fictional reality generally.

The demarcation between the narrated monologue and the two other techniques for rendering consciousness is generally easy to draw. Tense and person separate it from quoted monologue, even when the latter is used in the Joycean manner, without explicit quotation or introduction; the absence of mental verbs (and the resulting grammatical independence) separates it from psycho-narration. The following schema shows how the same thought-phrase would appear in the three techniques:

**quoted monologue**
(He thought:) I am late
(He thought:) I was late
(He thought:) I will be late

**narrated monologue**
He was late
He had been late
He would be late

**psycho-narration**
He knew he was late
He knew he had been late
He knew he would be late

A typical narrated-monologue sentence stands grammatically between the two other forms, sharing with quoted monologue the expression in the principal clause, with psycho-narration the tense system and the third-person reference.
When the thought is a question, the word-order of direct discourse is maintained in the narrated monologue, increasing its resemblance to quoted monologue and its distinction from psycho-narration:

*quoted monologue*

(He thought:) Am I late?

*narrated monologue*

Was he late?

*psycho-narration*

He wondered if he was late.

Minute as these differences may appear when schematized in this fashion, they reflect in simplest grammatical terms the basic relationship between the three techniques: in its meaning and function, as in its grammar, the narrated monologue holds a mid-position between quoted monologue and psycho-narration, rendering the content of a figural mind more obliquely than the former, more directly than the latter. Imitating the language a character uses when he talks to himself, it casts that language into the grammar a narrator uses in talking about him, thus superimposing two voices that are kept distinct in the other two forms. And this equivocation in turn creates the characteristic indeterminateness of the narrated monologue's relationship to the language of consciousness, suspending it between the immediacy of quotation and the mediacy of narration. Accordingly, its function fluctuates when it is found in the immediate vicinity of the other techniques: when it borders on psycho-narration, it takes on a more monologic quality and creates the impression of rendering thoughts explicitly formulated in the figural mind; when it borders on spoken or silent discourse, it takes on a more narratorial quality and creates the impression that the narrator is formulating his character's inarticulate feelings.

The problem of delimiting the narrated monologue from narration generally is far more complex, since purely linguistic criteria no longer provide reliable guidelines. Cloaked in the grammar of narration, a sentence rendering a character's opinion can look every bit like a sentence relating a fictional fact. In purely grammatical terms “He was late” (our sample sentence) could be a narrator's fact, rather than a character's thought. Within a broader context it might become possible to attribute it to a figural mind: for instance, if the next sentence belied the idea that “he was late”; or if the statement were embedded in a recognizable thought sequence. Woolf's “The rope was cut; he mounted; he was free” (in the passage quoted above) could, when taken out of context, be read as a narrator's description of a balloonist taking off for a flight. But in its context—the insane Septimus sitting on the Regent's Park bench, misinterpreting his wife's removal of her wedding ring—we understand these statements as the author means us to understand them, even before the following sentences more clearly signal monologic language. Obviously, an author who wants his reader to recognize a narrated monologue for what it is will have to plant sufficient clues for its recognition. These clues may be contextual, semantic, syntactic, or lexical, or variously combined. A narrated monologue,
in other words, reveals itself even as it conceals itself, but not always without making demands on its reader’s intelligence. The critic who suggested that the trial against Flaubert for Madame Bovary would not have taken place if the prosecutor had recognized that the “immoralities” it contained were Emma’s narrated monologues rather than Flaubert’s authorial statements may have overstated his case. But there is no doubt that this kind of confusion is responsible for innumerable misreadings—including some in print—of works that employ the technique.

In sum, the narrated monologue is at once a more complex and a more flexible technique for rendering consciousness than the rival techniques. Both its dubious attribution of language to the figural mind, and its fusion of narratorial and figural language charge it with ambiguity, give it a quality of now-you-see-it, now-you-don’t that exerts a special fascination. Even dry scholars wax poetical when they describe its effects. Here is an early German theorist’s description: “It lights up with vivid hues a realm that the reporting and describing narrator deliberately tones down by keeping it at a distance from himself. And it creates this effect far more readily than a narrative containing occasional monologues, where a more perceptible contrast exists between pure report and quoted thought. Its stirring effect depends on the fact that it is barely discernible to the naked eye: the device is irresistible precisely because it is apprehended almost unconsciously.”

Theoretical and Historical Perspective. In both France and Germany—where it goes respectively by the names style indirect libre and erlebte Rede—the narrated monologue has been the subject of intensive discussions ever since it was first identified around the turn of the century. The first students of the technique were grammarians and linguists, but—since literary scholarship in both these countries maintained a close relationship with philological studies—the phenomenon was soon discussed by such eminent literary scholars as Leo Spitzer, Oskar Walzel, and Albert Thibaudet. In the fifties there was a marked revival of interest in the phenomenon in Germany, this time in the context of more theoretical discussions, as erlebte Rede came increasingly to be regarded as a key concept for generic definitions of fiction, typologies of the novel, the nature of narrative language, and the development of modern narrative practices. In the recent writings of the French structural narratologists style indirect libre has played a less central role, perhaps because they have been more preoccupied with macro- than with micro-structures, and more with first- than with third-person forms of fiction. Still, it is a standard concept in French criticism today. Todorov, Genette, and others have variously related it to their central categories of mode, aspect, and voix, even if they have not yet given it the close attention it deserves in a systematic study of narrative discourse.

An entirely different situation exists in Anglo-American criticism, where the narrated monologue has until recently been virtually ignored, and where it bears no standard name. This neglect is especially surprising when we consider that an English writer was the first extensive practitioner of the form (Jane Austen), and that it has been the preferred mode for rendering con-
sciousness in the works of James, Lawrence, the early Joyce, Virginia Woolf, Thomas Wolfe et al. Even such sensitive theorists and historians of fiction as David Daiches, Ian Watt, or Scholes and Kellogg seem unaware of its existence, and Wayne Booth—though acquainted with the German term erlabelede Rede—dismisses it as an unwonted stylistic nicety.16 Not that the phenomenon has gone entirely unnoticed in individual texts: in a number of stylistically oriented studies one finds it aptly described, but always only as an idiosyncrasy of the particular writer or text under consideration. Here are three examples from James, Joyce, and Woolf criticism: For Gordon O. Taylor the method for rendering Isabel's thoughts in Chapter 42 of The Portrait of a Lady "although still cast in the third-person, [is] divested of most authorial trappings," and the "third-person intrusions approximate convincingly, though they fail to reproduce exactly, the links in her own train of thought."17 William M. Schutte, citing what is clearly a narrated-monologue passage from Joyce's Portrait, describes it as a combination of "the unselected stream of Stephen's consciousness" and a "traditional third person summary account."18 For David Daiches, Woolf's use of the technique in Mrs. Dalloway is a very special "compromise between reported thought and direct, unedited transcription of consciousness."19 The similarity in the foregoing quotations is obvious, and should of itself suggest that James', Joyce's, and Woolf's specimens belong to the same species. Is it perhaps because he has no name for the beast that each critic assigns it to the special fauna of the text he is examining? A common label for so widespread a stylistic phenomenon would, at any rate, clarify critical discourse: the heuristic value of a standard literary term is precisely to identify an individual occurrence as an instance (and variation) of a general norm.

In recent years, British and American linguists, using mostly the translated French term "free indirect style," have given mounting attention to this literary technique, with some even regarding it as the most fertile meeting ground between linguists and literary scholars.20 A number of less technical essays now exist in English as well, by literary critics familiar with the German and French background.21 But the concept—no matter by which of its names—has yet to enter the everyday language of criticism in English.

**My own term** "narrated monologue" as an English equivalent for style indirekt libre and erlabelede Rede calls for some justification and qualification. The French and German terms have generally designated not only the rendering of silent thought in narrated form, but also the analogous rendering of spoken discourse, which displays identical linguistic features.22 I have deliberately chosen a term that excludes this analogous employment of the technique, because in a literary—rather than a strictly linguistic—perspective the narration of silent thoughts presents problems that are quite separate, and far more intricate and interesting than those presented by its more vocal twin. "Narrated discourse" involves neither the ambiguity concerning the actual-potential status of language that characterizes the narrated monologue, nor the difficulties of recognizing it within its narrative context. It has seemed to me that so special a phenomenon deserves a separate name, a name that relates it to the other techniques for rendering consciousness, more nearly and more clearly than
other, more inclusive terms. For the purposes of the present study, at any rate, the overarching concern with the presentation of figural minds prompted the more restrictive term.

But the term "narrated monologue" is purposefully restrictive in yet another, more important sense: the denotative field of the French and German terms—and of their English equivalents—has, in recent years, grown far beyond the bounds of figural thought (and discourse) to include the entire realm of figural narration. Todorov has sketched its range of meanings as follows: "This term has been used to designate a family of phenomena which have common traits, but which nonetheless cannot be encompassed by a single definition. All cases of style indirect libre range between two limits: on the one side, a reported discourse that has the syntactic forms of indirect discourse, but that maintains certain characteristics of pragmatic speech; on the other side, a vision of reality that is not the narrator's own, but that of a fictional character, the so-called 'vision avec,' which does not necessarily conform to precise linguistic criteria." In its broadest meaning, then, at the second limit Todorov mentions above, style indirect libre becomes an alternate term for an entire mode of narration (vision avec—the term originally proposed by Pouillon—being roughly identical to figural narrative situation). It is this broad denotation that my more narrowly conceived term "narrated monologue" purposely excludes. By implying the correspondence to a (potential) quoted monologue, the more specific name pinpoints a more specific "thing." And even though the line of demarcation between figural thought and its immediate context may not always be easy to draw in practice, the term "narrated monologue" suggests a method for discerning its location—or for explaining its effacement.

The terminological separation of this technique for rendering consciousness from the narrative situation with which it has become associated seems to me important for at least three different reasons. 1. Narrated monologues can—as we shall see—also occasionally be very ironically used in authorial narrative contexts, and though its effect varies with its surroundings, its basic structure remains the same. 2. Conversely, figural narration can be used for quite different purposes than can the narration of consciousness: even Henry James and Kafka often use their protagonists merely to reflect (but not to reflect on) the external events they witness. Other devices then come into play, such as "narrated perception," and related techniques. 3. Finally, the narrated monologue is by no means the only method used for rendering consciousness in a figural context: we have already seen that the consonant type of psycho-narration and the unsignaled quoted monologue often supplement, and sometimes supplant, the narrated monologue form.

It is only when we have drawn this distinction between narrated monologue and figural narration that we can describe the very special relationship between them. It is one not only of part to whole, but of mutual affinity and enhancement: figural narration offers the narrated monologue its optimal habitat, and the narrated monologue caps the climax of figural narration. The first is true because the narrated monologue—in contrast to the quoted monologue—suppresses all marks of quotation that set it off from the narration,
and this self-effacement can be achieved most perfectly in a milieu where the narrative presentation adheres most consistently to a figural perspective, shaping the entire fictional world as an uninterrupted vision avec. The narrated monologue itself, however, is not vision avec, but what we might call pensée avec: here the coincidence of perspectives is compounded by a consonance of voices, with the language of the text momentarily resonating with the language of the figural mind. In this sense one can regard the narrated monologue as the quintessence of figural narration, if not of narration itself: as the moment when the thought-thread of a character is most tightly woven into the texture of third-person narration.

Critics have called on a variety of metaphors to describe this narrator-figure coincidence: optic, acoustic, geometric, textile, erotic, and so forth. It matters little which image we use, so long as it stresses the very special two-in-one effect created by this technique, without overstressing either its dualism or its monism. To speak only of a dual presence (perspective, voice, etc.) seems to me misleading: for the effect of the narrated monologue is precisely to reduce to the greatest possible degree the hiatus between the narrator and the figure existing in all third-person narration. But to speak simply of a single presence (perspective, voice, etc.) is even more misleading: for one then risks losing sight of the difference between third- and first-person narration; and before long the protagonists of figural novels (Stephen, K., Strether) become the “narrators” of their own stories. In narrated monologues, as in figural narration generally, the continued employment of third-person references indicates, no matter how unobtrusively, the continued presence of a narrator. And it is his identification—but not his identity—with the character’s mentality that is supremely enhanced by this technique.

If the narrated monologue is defined and understood in the manner outlined in the preceding pages, then the main stages of its historical development also become clear: its occasional occurrence in eighteenth-century “Histories” (of Tom Jones or Agathon), despite their over-all authorial-ironic cast; its upsurge in the nineteenth-century Realist novel, in rough correspondence with the rise of objective over obtrusive narrators, and of the inner over the outer scene; its expansion in the twentieth-century psychological novel, prompted by the unprecedented importance given to the language of consciousness, but with the narrated monologue now competing with the rival technique of the unsignaled “Joycean” monologue. Its evolution thus differs considerably from that of the quoted monologue and of psycho-narration: since the narrated monologue blurs the line between narration and quotation so dear to the old-fashioned authorial narrator, it makes its appearance rather late in the history of narrative genres. Its growth is also closely tied to a specific moment of the novel’s development: the moment when third-person fiction enters the domain previously reserved for first-person (epistolary or confessional) fiction, and begins to focus on the mental and emotional life of its characters.

It is not at all surprising, then, that Jane Austen should have been one of the first writers to use the narrated monologue frequently and extensively: for
it is in her work—as Ian Watt suggests in the epilogue to _The Rise of the Novel_—that the “divergent directions” of Richardson and Fielding were first brought together, launching the novel on its way toward their full-fledged “reconciliation” in Henry James.30 In her narrated monologues Austen seems precisely to cast the spirit of epistolary fiction into the mold of third-person narration. This happens at moments of inner crisis in several of her novels, as in the following example from _Emma:

How could she have been so deceived! He protested that he had never thought seriously of Harriet—never! . . .

The picture! How eager he had been about the picture! And the charade! And a hundred other circumstances; how clearly they had seemed to point at Harriet! To be sure, the charade, with its “ready wit”—but then, the “soft eyes”—in fact it suited neither; it was a jumble without taste or truth. Who could have seen through such thick-headed nonsense?31

And so forth, for a few more paragraphs, with the rhythm of inner debate—no matter how rhetorical and self-conscious—exactly transposed into narrative language, without explicit quotation or authorial explication. Most Victorian novelists, notably Eliot and Meredith, continued to use narrated monologues in this fashion, without altogether banishing the authorial tone from their novels as a whole.32

The decisive turning-point for the narrated monologue came, of course, with Flaubert. Perceptive students of his style agree that his systematic employment of the _style indirect libre_ is his most influential formal achievement. Proust said, in a famous essay, that this device “completely changes the appearance of things and beings, like a newly placed lamp, or a move into a new house.”33 Flaubert himself, when he comments on his “impersonal” narrative method, employs phrases that come close to pinpointing the narrated monologue itself, especially in the following passage from a letter to George Sand: “I expressed myself badly when I told you that ‘one should not write with one’s heart.’ I meant to say one should not put one’s personality on stage. I believe that great Art is scientific and impersonal. One should, by an effort of the spirit, transport oneself into the characters, not draw them to onself. That, at any rate, is the method” [my emphasis].34 Translating this kinetic image into linguistic terms would yield an exact description of the narrated monologue—as would the theological image Flaubert used elsewhere, when he referred to his “faculté panthéiste.”35

After Flaubert, as Thibaudet remarks, the _style indirect libre_ enters “into the common current of novelistic style, abounds in Daudet, Zola, Maupassant, everyone.”36 Whenever Naturalist novels focus on individual lives and on instantaneous experiences—say in Maupassant’s _Une Vie_, or Zola’s _Le Docteur Pascal_, or the Gervaise scenes of _L’Assommoir_—their pages teem with narrated monologues, hardly ever lapsing into directly quoted ones. Yet, in view of the Naturalists’ predilection for mass scenes, wide temporal vistas, manifest behavior and dialogues, they created relatively few extended occasions for the employment of narrated monologues. Such occasions had to await the “inward turning” of the novel: those writers who believed with Henry James that “what
a man thinks and what he feels are the history and the character of what he does.” In James’ own theoretical pronouncements, which so persistently revolve around the axis of the narrator-protagonist relationship, we find images that come even closer than Flaubert’s to describing the narrated monologue. Given James’ general reticence in erotic matters, it is both amusing and significant to find him using in this connection what is probably the most direct allusion to the sexual act in his entire oeuvre: “A beautiful infatuation this, always, I think, the intensity of the creative effort to get into the skin of the creature; the act of personal possession of one being by another at its completest.”

This espousal of a character by his narrator “at its completest” is precisely what James attains in moments when he uses the narrated monologue.

The pattern set by Jane Austen thus unfolds throughout the nineteenth century: precisely those authors who, in their major works, most decisively abandoned first-person narration (Flaubert, Zola, James), instituting instead the norms of the dramatic novel, objective narration, and unobtrusive narrators, were the ones who re-introduced the subjectivity of private experience into the novel: this time not in terms of direct self-narration, but by imperceptibly integrating mental reactions into the neutral-objective report of actions, scenes, and spoken words.

When the Impressionist and Expressionist writers in Germany, and the stream-of-consciousness writers in England began to shape more slowly paced novels dominated by their characters’ fluid mental responses to momentary experience, they found in the narrated monologue a ready-made technique that could easily be adapted to the new aims. Unlike the quoted monologue, it needed no Joycean revolution to make it a workable instrument for recording the minutiae of the inner life. Hence it acted as a kind of stylistic bridge that led from nineteenth- to twentieth-century fiction. Far from being a mark of modernity, the narrated monologue is a device that the novelists of our century who are most conservative in matters of form (Thomas Wolfe, Mauriac, or Lawrence) share with such experimental novelists as Virginia Woolf, Broch, Sarraute, or Robbe-Grillet. The difference lies only in the quantitative relationship of the narrated monologue to its narrative context: in *Mrs. Dalloway*, *The Death of Virgil*, *The Planetarium*, *The Voyeur*, the narrative text appears as the adjunct of the narrated monologue, rather than the other way around.

This brief historical synopsis of the technique must now be supplemented by closer study of its various functions and effects.

**Irony and Sympathy.** The narrated monologue, unlike the quoted monologue, does not readily shape itself into an independent fictional text, for by referring to the character whose thoughts it renders in the third person it includes the narrative voice in its language, and the monologic effect it creates vanishes the moment fictional facts reappear. As we have seen in the *Portrait* passage quoted earlier, when we read the sentence sequence: “But God had promised to forgive him if he was sorry. He was sorry. He clasped his hands and raised them towards the white form . . . ,” the moment Stephen’s manual gesture appears, the monologic impression is dispelled. The narrated monologue is thus essentially an evanescent form, dependent on the narrative voice.
that mediates and surrounds it, and is therefore peculiarly dependent on tone and context.

Many novels that use the narrated monologue as the predominant technique for rendering their characters' consciousness start from a neutral and objective narrative stance—typically the description of a specific site or situation—and only gradually, often by way of minimal exposition, narrow their focus to the figural mind. The first sentence of *L'Education sentimentale* reads as follows: "On the 15th of September 1840, about six o'clock in the morning, the Ville de Montereau was ready to sail from the quai Saint-Bernard, and clouds of smoke were pouring from its funnel." From this soberly informational base, Flaubert's text then imperceptibly gravitates, within a few pages, to the emotive speculations with which Frederic reacts to Madame Arnoux's "apparition": "What was her name, her home, her life, her past? . . . He supposed her to be of Andalusian origin, perhaps a creole. Had she brought the negroes back with her from the West Indies?" From here on the narrator will glide in and out of Frederic's mind at will, adopting his protagonist's inner language at crucial moments, but always free to return to his objective narrative base, to describe minutely the protagonist's actions and his surroundings, or to sketch with broader strokes changes of circumstance occurring over longer periods.

But no matter how "impersonal" the tone of the text that surrounds them, narrated monologues themselves tend to commit the narrator to attitudes of sympathy or irony. Precisely because they cast the language of a subjective mind into the grammar of objective narration, they amplify emotional notes, but also throw into ironic relief all false notes struck by a figural mind. A narrator can in turn exploit both possibilities, even with the same character, and Flaubert exploits them both with Frederic, alternately stressing the pathos of his love for Madame Arnoux and the blunders of his social and professional choices. Sympathy predominates in this passage that renders Frederic's thoughts after the Arnoux bankruptcy:

> And afterwards? What would become of her? Would she be a schoolmistress, a companion, or even a lady's maid? She had been abandoned to all the perils of poverty. His ignorance of her fate tormented him. He should have prevented her flight, or else followed her. Was he not her real husband?

and irony predominates in this passage where he decides on his "future":

> He wondered, seriously, if he was to be a great painter, or a great poet; and he decided in favour of painting, for the demands of this profession would bring him closer to Madame Arnoux. So he had found his vocation! The aim of his existence was now clear, and the future infallible.

In the first quotation the narrator creates the impression that he is seriously identifying with Frederic's anguish; in the second he mockingly seems to identify with his inauthentic decision.

In *L'Education sentimentale* these alternating attitudes of empathy and parody are applied by the narrator to a single protagonist. But the narrated monologue also enables a narrator to weave in and out of several characters' minds. Virginia Woolf is the master-weaver of such multi-figural novels.
From Clarissa to Peter, from Rezia to Septimus, from Mrs. to Mr. Ramsay, narrated monologues pass from hers to his and back again, often without intervening narrative sentences. But in transit the tone can change, and it often does when the gender of the pronoun changes. In *To the Lighthouse* a lyric climax is reached with the narration of Mrs. Ramsay’s “wedge of darkness” meditation, a parodistic climax with the narration of Mr. Ramsay’s “He reached Q” rumination. The fertile feminine mind and the arid masculine mind are both relayed by the same narrator’s grammar, but the former’s language is heightened by the transposition, the latter’s is abated.

The ironic pole of this tonal range is most clearly in evidence when narrated monologues show up in a pronouncedly authorial milieu, framed by explicit commentary. Here is how the Stendhal narrator presents Fabrice’s reactions to the filching of his horse by his own comrades at the Battle of Waterloo:

> He could find no consolation for so great an infamy, and, leaning his back against a willow, began to shed hot tears. He abandoned one by one all those beautiful dreams of a chivalrous and sublime friendship, like that of the heroes of the *Gerusalemme Liberata*. To see death come to one was nothing, surrounded by heroic and tender hearts, by noble friends who clasp one by the hand as one yields one’s dying breath! But to retain one’s enthusiasm surrounded by a pack of vile scoundrels!!! Like all angry men Fabrizio exaggerated. After a quarter of an hour of this melting mood...44

A character’s illusions and a narrator’s worldliness, romance and realism clash head-on here, with the triple exclamation mark signaling the “exaggeration” of Fabrice’s language even before it is spelled out after the fact. Framed in this fashion by markedly dissonant psycho-narration, a narrated monologue appears as though it were enclosed in tacit quotation marks, creating an effect of mock-impersonation. The metaphor of an actor playing a role, which a number of critics have applied to the narrator-character relationship created by the narrated monologue,45 is valid here only if we expand it to include the actor schooled in Brechtian alienating techniques.

Even abrupter alienation is achieved when authorial remarks are enclosed within a narrated monologue. An interesting instance of this kind occurs in *The Magic Mountain*, when the amorous Hans Castorp catches himself singing a love ditty from the lowlands, turns a critical glance on its banal language, and in turn prompts his narrator to turn a critical glance on his hero’s language:

> This kind of sentimental ditty might very well satisfy and please some young man who had quite legitimately, peacefully, and optimistically “given his heart,” as the saying goes, to some healthy little goose down there in the flatlands.... But for him and his relationship with Madame Chauchat—the word “relationship” must be charged to his account, we refuse to take the responsibility for it—this kind of ditty was decidedly inappropriate.46

Note that the narrator, even as he dissociates himself from his character, draws attention to the fact that it is not he, but his character, who here engenders
the vocabulary of the narrative text. He is actually teaching his reader an in-
stant lesson in narrative technique, as much as to say: don’t be deceived by
appearances, this passage may look like my narration, but it is really a mono-
logue that I am narrating—verbatim.47

Such explicitly ironic narrators play easier games with the narrated mono-
logue than those who pretend sympathy for their characters in the surrounding
text, creating what might be called mock-figural narrative situations. In Sar-
tre’s Bildungsnovella of a budding fascist, “L’Enfance d’un chef,” the narrator
adopts, from beginning to end, the point of view of Lucien, his salot-
protagonist. Inauthenticity stands most clearly revealed not in the purely nar-
ative sections of the work, but at those moments when Lucien’s own language
appears in the guise of narration. The following narrated monologue toward
the end of the story tells how he discovers in anti-Semitism a long-searched-
for identity and virility:

He absolutely had to find words to express this extraordinary discovery. Qui-
etly, cautiously, he raised his hand to his forehead, like a lighted candle, then
collected himself, for an instant, thoughtful and sacred, and the words came of
themselves, he murmured: “I HAVE RIGHTS!” Rights! Something in the na-
ture of triangles and circles: it was so perfect that it didn’t exist, no matter how
many thousands of rings you traced with a compass, you could never make a
single circle. In the same way generations of workers could scrupulously obey
the commands of Lucien, they would never exhaust his right to command,
rights were beyond existence, like mathematical objects or religious dogmas.
And Lucien was precisely that: an enormous bouquet of responsibilities and
rights.48

This language creates its own distancing effects from within; exaggerations,
pompously narcissistic imagery, the false analogy between mathematical, reli-
gious, and social absolutes: all build up the devastating portrait of an inauthen-
tic man.

The first half of the “Nausicaa” section of Ulysses uses narrated mono-
logues in a similar context, melted into mock-figural narration.49 The narra-
tor’s style is at times so strongly “infected” by Gerty’s own mental idiom that
it is difficult to draw borderlines between narration and narrated monologue—
even more difficult than in the Ulysses sections that quote Bloom’s or Stephen’s
thoughts directly, since no help is offered by changing person or tense. Yet a
narrator is distinctly present, and it is his burlesque of sentimental kitsch that
molds the common denominator between his narration and Gerty’s thoughts:

She gazed out towards the distant sea. . . . And while she gazed her heart went
pitapat. Yes, it was her he was looking at and there was meaning in his look.
His eyes burned into her as though they would search her through and through,
read her very soul. Wonderful eyes they were, superbly expressive, but could
you trust them? People were so queer.50

From “Yes” on, the sentences lend themselves to translation into quoted
monologue. But the preceding sentences—“pitapat” and all—are purely nar-
rative even as they speak of Gerty as she would speak of herself.
The satirical force of both Joyce's and Sartre's narrative style in these texts relies in part on the shock effect created by the parody of a norm: the normal milieu for narrated monologue is serious figural narration. The empathic pole of this technique's tonal scale can be observed in all the more celebrated novels of this type: James' Ambassadors, Joyce's Portrait, Lawrence's Plumed Serpent, the three Kafka novels, Robbe-Grillet's Voyeur. Their protagonists—no matter how distorted or benighted they may be—are presented to the reader's understanding "from within," through a profusion of narrated monologues.

One of the most poignant instances is a frequently quoted passage from the penultimate paragraph of The Trial. It renders Josef K.'s thoughts instants before he is slaughtered by his two executioners:

His glance fell on the top story of the house adjoining the quarry. With a flicker as of a light going up, the casements of a window there suddenly flew open, a human figure, faint and insubstantial at that distance and that height, leaned abruptly far forward and stretched both arms still farther. Who was it? A friend? A good man? Someone who sympathized? Someone who wanted to help? Was it one person only? Or was it mankind? Was help at hand? Were there arguments in his favor that one had overlooked? Of course there must be. Logic is doubtless unshakable, but it cannot withstand a man who wants to go on living. Where was the Judge whom he had never seen? Where was the High Court, to which he had never penetrated? He raised his hands and spread out all his fingers. 51

This is the moment of his novel where Kafka perhaps comes closest to "giving away" the existential implications of The Trial, or at least the fact that the work has existential implications. And it is not coincidental that this moment takes the form of a narrated monologue: had it been quoted directly, signaled as K.'s mental language, fenced off from the surrounding narration, it could not have implicated the narrator (and the reader) in K.'s anguish to nearly the same degree. The cumulative interrogations—a syntactic pattern typical of Kafka's narrated monologues—bring to a climax in extremis all the unknowns that have been gathering throughout the novel. Prompted by the vision of the lone figure in the window—perhaps a projection of the self—this crescendo of narrated questions leads from the specific and concrete "Who was it?" to the general and abstract "was help at hand . . . ? Where was the Judge . . . ? the High Court . . . ?" The impersonal forms (one, a man) further underline the "everyman" status K. acquires here. And the gnomic present tense in the sentence "Logic is doubtless unshakable . . ."—a rare occurrence in Kafka's third-person works—further suggests that this penultimate moment of the novel builds a deliberate stylistic (as well as thematic) climax. By contrast, the direct quotation of K.'s dying words—"'Like a dog!', he said"—abruptly cuts the empathic communication.

Hermann Broch's Death of Virgil—a novel he himself called a stretched-out lyric poem—shows what happens when this kind of stylistic pitch is extended over hundreds of pages. The formal experiment is entirely in keeping with the daring subject: a verbal artist's lone mental crisis during the last eigh-
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teen hours of his life. Adhering closely to Virgil's feverish mind, the text's more than five hundred pages minutely render the continuous flow of his hyper-consciousness until it comes to a halt with words that signal and signify passage into death: "it was the word beyond speech." The work's time structure thus approaches that of autonomous monologues like "Penelope," in which a character's mental language simultaneously determines the forward movement of fictional time and text, without elision or summary.

Broch's own description of his work indicates his precise awareness of the technique he used to render this continuous mental experience: "Even though it is presented in the third person, it is the interior monologue of a poet." Yet, technically, this description is something of an overstatement: even this work, taken as a whole, cannot be regarded as an uninterrupted narrated monologue. For one thing, it begins with an omniscient prelude that, after describing Augustus' fleet approaching the harbor of Brundisium, introduces the protagonist with solemn formality: "on the ship that immediately followed was the poet of the Aeneid and death's signet was engraved upon his brow." But even after the marathon of narrated monologues begins in the following paragraph, the narrative voice occasionally reappears to report internal and external changes, inner visions and outer sights, and especially Virgil's own physical gestures. If the novel nonetheless creates the impression of absolute homogeneity, of a poetic monologue from beginning to end, it is because the narrative voice is tuned to exactly the same pitch as the figural voice; or, phrased in terms of the acting metaphor applied earlier, the narrated monologue here casts the narrator in a role that coincides with his own "real" self. It becomes the choice medium for the mental portraiture of a verbal artist by a verbal artist, both joined in a language flow of sustained poetic prose.

Because the method works cumulatively, by huge "serpent-sentences" and tightly woven imagistic-ideational complexes, quotation can only faintly suggest the effect. Here is a minimal illustration (from the opening section; Virgil is observing the gluttony of the courtiers on board ship):

Everywhere there was someone putting something into his mouth, everywhere smouldering avarice and lust, rootless but ready to devour, all-devouring, their fumes waivered over the deck, carried along on the beat of the oars, inescapable, unavoidable; the whole ship was lapped in a wave of greed. Oh, they deserved to be shown up once for what they were! A song of avarice should be dedicated to them! But what would that accomplish? Nothing avails the poet, he can right no wrongs; he is heeded only if he extols the world, never if he portrays it as it is. Only falsehood wins renown, not understanding! And could one assume that the Aeneid would be vouchsafed another or better influence? [my emphasis]

The passage contains two typical devices for melding the narrating and the figural voices. First, by rendering what Virgil sees in Virgil's own emotive-lyrical idiom, scenic description (the first sentence) flows uninterrupted into the narrated exclamations that follow. But whereas a conjunction of poetic description and monologue is not itself unusual in novels that adopt the vision avec, it is rarely so effective and convincing: here the perceiving mind belongs
to a creative poet, who would naturally (professionally) transmute the reality he perceives into poetic language—at the very moment when he perceives it.

The second device is more special to Broch, and he uses it perennially: when Virgil formulates generalizations in his mind, the tense of the narrated monologue shifts from past to present: “Nothing avails the poet, he can right no wrong; he is heeded only if he extols the world, never if he portrays it as it is. Only falsehood wins renown, not understanding.” Note that these statements sound identical to a narrator’s *ex cathedra* statements in gnomic present tense. But since they continue (and are continued by) the statements of the narrated thought-sequence, they must be interpreted as quotations of Virgil’s monologic language. Clearly Broch has created this equivocation of vocal origins systematically, in order to fuse narrator and character inextricably in the language of philosophic commentary. This gnomic language later reaches climactic density and intensity in long passages of versified poetry that grow out of and merge back into Virgil’s narrated monologues.

In Broch’s *Death of Virgil*, then, the narrated monologue reaches both quantitatively and qualitatively an extreme limit. The near-continuous employment of the technique in its most empathic form, inducing a radical fusion of narrating and figural voices, leads third-person narration to the frontiers where it borders at once on lyric poetry and philosophic discourse.

Notes


2. This Hamlet speech is not, of course, strictly speaking, a monologue, since he speaks it in the presence of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern. But for my present purposes this fact is not relevant.

3. Cf. Roland Barthes’s suggestion that certain passages in third-person texts can be “rewritten” (he uses the Frenchified verb “rewriter”) in the first person (“Introduction à l’analyse structurale des récits,” *Communications* 8 [1966], 1-27, p. 20). See also Richard Ohmann’s application of the “transformation” concept to a Hemingway text containing narrated monologue (“Generative Grammars and the Concept of Literary Style,” *Word* 20 [1964], 423-439).


es fast ihn selbst schmerzte. Oder sollte das Unglaubliche geschehen sein, und sie waren schon im Schloss oder vor seinen Toren? Aber sie waren ja, soweit K. wusste, gar nicht gestiegen. Oder hatte ihn Barnabas einen so unmerklich ansteigenden Weg geführt? "Wo sind wir?" fragte K. leise, mehr sich als ihn" [my emphasis].


7. This "as if" quality of narrated monologue has been described by Harald Weinrich (*Tempus* [Stuttgart, 1964], p. 233). Paul Hernadi similarly designates the mental life rendered through this technique as "quasi-verbal" ("Dual Perspective: Free Indirect Discourse and Related Techniques," *Comparative Literature* 24 [1972], p. 39).

8. For a comprehensive study of all the different "signals" that characterize narrated monologue, see R. J. Lethcoe, "Narrated Speech and Consciousness," Ph.D. Diss. Wisconsin, 1969, pp. 79–169. Ludomir Dolezel's survey of "Discriminative Features in Czech Represented Discourse" (*Narrative Modes in Czech Literature* [Toronto, 1973], pp. 20–40) is equally useful.


10. Oskar Walzel, "Von 'erlebter' Rede" in *Das Wortkunstwerk* (1926, rpt. Heidelberg, 1968), p. 228. This essay was published before Joyce was known in Germany.

11. Several of the early articles on *erlebte Rede* appeared in the *Germanisch-romanische Monatsschrift* before World War I, notably those of Charles Bally and Eugen Lerch. During the nineteen-twenties the following books discussed the subject at length: Etienne Lorck, *Die "erlebte Rede": eine sprachliche Untersuchung* (Heidelberg, 1921); Marguerite Lips, *Le Style indirect libre* (Paris, 1926); Werner Günther, *Probleme der Rededarstellung* (Marburg, 1928). A detailed presentation of the research before 1930 is given in Lethcoe's dissertation, pp. 12–53.


14. Genette, whose "Discours du récit" is centered on *A la Recherche*, devotes only one paragraph to *style indirect libre*, which he classifies as a "variant" of indirect discourse, and illustrates with a rather lame example from Proust (*Figures III*, Paris, 1972, p. 192). Todorov leaves it out of consideration in *Littérature et signification*, but discusses it briefly in "Les registres de la parole," *Journal de Psychologie* (1967), pp. 265–278, esp. pp. 271–272. In view of the importance both these critics give to the relationship between narration and discourse, it is surprising that they have never studied the technique where the borderline between these two language fields becomes effaced.

15. The two books on the stream-of-consciousness novel by Humphrey and Fried-
man are exceptions of sorts. Humphrey, without referring to the French or German terms, identifies an "indirect interior monologue" which he illustrates with examples from *Ulysses* and *Mrs. Dalloway* (*Stream of Consciousness in the Modern Novel* [Berkeley, 1954], pp. 28-33). His examples make it evident that "indirect interior monologue," far from being a technique special to the stream-of-consciousness novel, however, is in reality identical to the *style indirect libre–erlebte Rede* found in most standard nineteenth- and twentieth-century fiction. Melvin Friedman does make the connection between Humphrey's term and the standard French term. But he confuses the issue by maintaining that *style indirect libre* is an "imperfect" forerunner of "indirect interior monologue" (*Stream of Consciousness: A Study in Literary Method* [New Haven, 1955], p. 21; see also pp. 4, 63, 198, 233). I explain below (n. 24) why I consider Humphrey's term misleading.


17. *The Passages of Thought: Psychological Representation in the American Novel 1870-1900* (New York, 1969), pp. 64, 70. See also Ian Watt, "The First Paragraph of *The Ambassadors*: An Explication," *Essays in Criticism* 10 (1960), 250-274. Watt evidently has narrated monologue passages in mind when he says: "because the narrator's consciousness and Strether's are both present, we often don't know whose mental operations and evaluative judgments are involved in particular cases" (p. 261). When Watt describes the transition from the third to the fourth sentence of *The Ambassadors* as a rapid passing "from the objective analysis . . . to what must be a verbatim quotation from Strether's mind" (pp. 261-262), he is actually referring to a quite standard passage from psycho–narration to narrated monologue.


20. See, for example, William O. Hendricks, who singles out free indirect style as one of the key problems extending linguistics "beyond the sentence in the sense of proceeding from function to form" ("On the Notion 'Beyond the Sentence,'" *Linguistics* 37 [1967], 12-31, pp. 38-40).

In England, free indirect style was a focus of attention for a group of stylistic linguists at the University of Leeds, working under the Romance philologist Stephen Ullmann. Ullmann's own chapter, "Reported Speech and internal monologue in Flaubert," in *Style in the French Novel* (Oxford, 1964) is still one of the best studies of the subject in English. For a recent approach by an American linguist, see Ann Banfield, "Narrative Style and the Grammar of Direct and Indirect Speech," *Foundations of Language* 10 (1973), 1-39.

21. See especially Paul Hernadi, "Dual Perspective: Free Indirect Discourse and Related Techniques," and R. J. Lethcoe's previously mentioned dissertation. See also my "Narrated Monologue: Definition of a Fictional Style" (*Comparative Literature* 18 [1966], 97-112), which represents an early version of the present chapter, and where I first introduced the term "narrated monologue." The new book by the British Ger-
manist Roy Pascal, *The Dual Voice: Free Indirect Speech and its Functions in the Nineteenth-Century European Novel* (Manchester, 1977), reached me only after completion of my manuscript.


23. For a discussion of terms used in English, see Lethcoe, pp. 4-5. Lethcoe's own approach through descriptive linguistics prompts his preference for the umbrella-term "narrated speech," which he in turn divides into "narrated inner speech" (my "narrated monologue") and "narrated outer speech." This minor terminological difference reflects the different emphasis of Lethcoe's study from my own.

24. Although Humphrey's term "indirect interior monologue" is as limited as mine, its first modifier is based on a misleading analogy with indirect discourse—assuming as it does that this technique for rendering consciousness is "indirect" in the same sense as quoted interior monologue is "direct." Both Humphrey's term and the false analogy stem from Dujardin (*Le Monologue intérieur* [Paris, 1931], pp. 39-40).


26. Cf. Hernadi's much broader term "substitutionary narration," which corresponds to *vision avec* (or the figural narrative situation) rather than to what I call narrated monologue. Hernadi's sub-category of "substitutionary thought," however, corresponds exactly to narrated monologue ("Dual Perspective," pp. 35 and 38).

27. Phrases like "duplicity," "double perspective," "twofold vision," "dual voice" crop up constantly in analyses of novels using the narrated monologue. Ian Watt, for example, speaks of "the split narrative point of view" and the "dual presence of Strether's consciousness and of that of the narrator" in *The Ambassadors*, when he is actually trying to define their singular fusion in the Jamesian text. ("The First Paragraph of The Ambassadors," pp. 259, 266.)


29. In her linguistic discussion, Ann Banfield cuts through the problem of the narrator-character relationship in narrated monologue texts by suggesting that it makes no sense to talk of a narrator in such texts at all ("Narrative Style," pp. 34-38). I do not find her argument convincing. As she herself admits, narrated monologues are sometimes found in the same texts with audible narrators, and vice versa. In the narratoreless model she proposes for the narrated monologue there would be no way of accounting for the continuity of the voice that refers to the protagonist in the same third-person form in passages of authorial commentary and of narrated monologue. The model of a narrator who identifies or coheres with the figural consciousness still seems the most satisfying one to account for the narrated monologue.


31. *Emma*, ch. 16.


34. Letter to George Sand, 15–16 Dec., 1866 (Correspondence V [Paris, 1929], p. 257).


41. “Il se demanda, sérieusement, s’il serait un grand peintre ou un grand poète; et il se décida pour la peinture, car les exigences de ce métier le rapprocheraient de Mme Arnoux. Il avait donc trouvé sa vocation! Le but de son existence était clair maintenant, et l’avenir infaillible.” Op cit., p. 82; trans., p. 48.

42. See, for example, *Mrs. Dalloway*, pp. 70–71, 101; *To the Lighthouse* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World [Harvest Book], n.d.), pp. 100, 226.

43. *To the Lighthouse*, pp. 95–100, 53–57.


45. See, e.g., Hugo Friedrich, *Drei Klassiker des französischen Romans* (Frankfurt a. M., 1966), p. 128: “The narrator does not stand next to his figures, but he slips inside them. . . . He becomes the actor who plays the role of his figures.”


47. In “Erlebte und verschleierte Rede,” Norbert Miller points out that this tongue-in-cheek variety has a much longer history than the serious narrated monologue form—a change that corresponds to the general evolution of the novel from the authorial to the figural pole. Modern ironists like Mann and Musil, however, revert to the older form with particular gusto. See Werner Hoffmeister, *Studien zur erlebten Rede bei Thomas Mann und Robert Musil* (The Hague, 1965), pp. 110–127.

48. “Il fallait absolument trouver des mots pour exprimer son extraordinaire dé-
couverte. Il éleva doucement, précautionneusement sa main jusqu'à son front, comme un cierge allumé, puis il se recueillit un instant, pensif et sacré, et les mots vinrent d'eux-mêmes, il murmura: "J'AI DES DROITS!" Des Droits! Quelle chose dans le genre des triangles et des cercles: c'était si parfait que ça n'existait pas, on avait beau tracer des milliers de rondes avec des compas, on n'arrivait pas à réaliser un seul cercle. Des générations d'ouvriers pourraient, de même, obéir scrupuleusement aux ordres de Lucien, ils n'épuiseraient jamais son droit à commander, les droits c'était par delà l'existence, comme les objets mathématiques et les dogmes religieux. Et voilà que Lucien, justement, c'était ça: un immense bouquet de responsabilités et de droits." "L'Enfance d'un chef," in Le Mur (Paris: Gallimard, 1939), p. 220.

49. Robert Humphrey seems to be the only critic to have identified correctly the basic technique of the Gerty-half of "Nausicaa" (Stream of Consciousness, pp. 30-31).


54. "Überall gab es einen, der etwas in den Mund steckte, überall schwelte Begehrlichkeit, schwelte Habuch, wurzellos, schlingbereit, allesverschlingend, ihr Brodem flackerte über das Deck hin, wurde im Rucktakte der Ruder mitbefördert, unentrinnbar, unablösbar: das ganze Schiff war von Gier umflackert. Oh, sie verdienten es, einmal richtig dargestellt zu werden! Ein Gesang der Gier müsste ihnen gewidmet werden! Doch was sollte dies schon nützen?! nichts vermag der Dichter, keinem Über vermag er abzuholen; er wird nur dann gehört, wenn er die Welt verherrlicht, nicht jedoch, wenn er sie darstellt, wie sie ist. Bloss die Lüge ist Ruhm, nicht die Erkenntnis! Und wäre es da denkbar, dass der Aneis eine andere, eine bessere Wirkung vergönnt sein sollte?" Der Tod des Vergil, pp. 13-14; The Death of Virgil, p. 15. (I have altered the tense of two verb-forms to make the translation correspond to the original; see n. 55 below.)

55. Unfortunately, with a few exceptions, the passages that employ the present tense in the original were translated into the English past tense. This change, as the "Translator's Note" explains, was deliberate (The Death of Virgil, p. 488). Though it was made on rather doubtful linguistic grounds, the fact that it was made with Broch's approval is definite proof that he envisioned the present-tense passages as monologic, rather than authorial, language. But the ambiguity created by the present tense in the original gets lost in the English—though it is, in all other respects, a masterful translation.

56. The "Hymns against Beauty" and the "Elegies on Fate" (The Death of Virgil, pp. 97ff. and 200ff.).